The discovery that midbrain dopamine neurons emit a teaching signal when an unexpected reward or reward-predicting cue occurs has transformed how we conceptualize dopamine function 1 . The response to unpredicted rewards, initially large, wanes as the subject comes to anticipate the rewarding event, transferring instead to antecedent stimuli that reliably predict future reward. This finding has been influential because transient changes in dopamine are so like the prediction errors proposed as driving learning in reinforcement learning models 2-5 . Indeed, the dopaminergic prediction error has become almost synonymous with the reward prediction error defined in these models. However, these errors are thought to support only a relatively limited form of learning, in which predictive cues are endowed with a scalar quantity that reflects the rewarding value of future events at the time of learning. This cached or model-free value does not capture any specific information about the identity of those future events, even in more expansive recent proposals that incorporate elements of reward structure 4 . As a result, the behaviors supported by these values are relatively inflexible, since they cannot reflect information about the predicted events other than their general value at the time of learning.
a r t I C l e S
The discovery that midbrain dopamine neurons emit a teaching signal when an unexpected reward or reward-predicting cue occurs has transformed how we conceptualize dopamine function 1 . The response to unpredicted rewards, initially large, wanes as the subject comes to anticipate the rewarding event, transferring instead to antecedent stimuli that reliably predict future reward. This finding has been influential because transient changes in dopamine are so like the prediction errors proposed as driving learning in reinforcement learning models [2] [3] [4] [5] . Indeed, the dopaminergic prediction error has become almost synonymous with the reward prediction error defined in these models. However, these errors are thought to support only a relatively limited form of learning, in which predictive cues are endowed with a scalar quantity that reflects the rewarding value of future events at the time of learning. This cached or model-free value does not capture any specific information about the identity of those future events, even in more expansive recent proposals that incorporate elements of reward structure 4 . As a result, the behaviors supported by these values are relatively inflexible, since they cannot reflect information about the predicted events other than their general value at the time of learning.
Yet much behavior reflects specific information about predicted events, rewarding or otherwise 6 . Such behavior reveals the existence of a rich and navigable associative representation or model of the structure of the environment. For instance, when walking into your favorite neighborhood restaurant, you expect not only a good meal but also one that consists of sushi, not pasta. Because this prediction contains specific information beyond value, it supports flexible and adaptive behavior [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] . You might love Japanese and Italian food equally, but if you become pregnant and are instructed to avoid raw fish, you can adjust your choice of restaurant without additional direct experience. Can dopaminergic prediction errors support the formation of these model-based associations, or do they only support learning of model-free associations that contain scalar values? Although optogenetic studies have confirmed that dopamine transients can function as errors to support associative learning [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] , this critical question remains unaddressed, since in each of these experiments the resultant behavior could be accounted for by model-free learning mechanisms.
Here we directly address this question using sensory preconditioning [19] [20] [21] [22] in rats. Sensory preconditioning entails presenting subjects with two neutral cues, for example, C and X, in close succession, such that a predictive relationship C→X can form between them. Notably, in this preconditioning phase, no rewards are delivered, and consequently no new behavioral responses or scalar values are learned. However, the contents of what is learned in preconditioning can be revealed if the second cue is subsequently paired with an unconditional stimulus, for instance, a reward (i.e., X→US). Subsequently, both C and X will elicit robust conditioned responses. Since C was never paired with reward, the response to C demonstrates the existence of an associative link between C and X. The use of this C→X association to support responding for the reward is a classic example of model-based behavior.
We used this behavioral approach in two experiments. The first was designed to test whether a dopamine transient is sufficient to support the formation of the associative representations underlying modelbased behavior. For this, we combined sensory preconditioning with blocking 23 , a procedure developed to show that associative learning a r t I C l e S depends on the presence of a prediction error. While blocking has previously been shown only in the context of learning about a valuable reward 23 , we hypothesized that learning associations that do not involve reward or value should also be regulated by an error mechanism. To test this, we applied the same logic used in reward blocking to reduce acquisition of the C→X relationship during preconditioning. In particular, we first paired a different cue, A, with X (A→X). Then, during preconditioning, A was presented in compound with C, followed by X (AC→X). Because A already predicts X, if learning of the stimulus-stimulus association was driven by errors in prediction, the presence of A should diminish or block the formation of any association between C and X. Indeed, we observed such blocking in pilot testing (Supplementary Fig. 1 ), confirming that initial learning in sensory preconditioning was driven by prediction errors (termed 'state prediction errors' in current computational models 8 ), even though there was no reward or value present.
Against this background, we attempted to reinstate learning of the C→X association by briefly activating the dopamine neurons at the start of the X cue in the AC→X trials, using parameters designed to evoke firing similar to that sometimes observed for rewards 13, [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] or even neutral cues 24, 29, 30 . We reasoned that if dopamine transients can support learning of associations between the neural representations of events in the environment, as opposed to being restricted to the addition or subtraction of value, then this manipulation should restore normal sensory preconditioning of C. In a second experiment, we tested the necessity of dopamine for this learning process by suppressing the dopamine neurons across the transition between the cues during a standard sensory preconditioning task. The results of the two experiments show that dopamine transients were both sufficient and likely necessary to support the acquisition of the associative structures underlying model-based behavior.
RESULTS

Dopamine transients are sufficient for the formation of model-based associations
Prior to training, all rats underwent surgery to infuse virus and implant fiber optics targeting the ventral tegmental area (VTA; Fig. 1 ). We infused AAV5-EF1α-DIO-ChR2-eYFP (channelrhodopsin-2 (ChR2) experimental group; n = 18) or AAV5-EF1α-DIO-eYFP (eYFP control group; n = 19) into the VTA of rats expressing Cre recombinase under the control of the tyrosine hydroxylase (TH) promoter 31 . After surgery and recovery, rats were food-restricted until their body weight reached 85% of baseline and training commenced. Training began with 2 d of preconditioning. On the first day, the rats received a total of 16 pairings of two 10-s neutral cues (A→X). On the second day, the rats continued to receive pairings of the same two neutral cues (A→X; 8 trials). In addition, on other trials, the first cue was presented together with a second, novel neutral cue (either AC→X or AD→X; 8 trials each). On AC trials, blue light (473 nm, 20 Hz, 16-18 mW output; Shanghai Laser & Optics Century Co., Ltd) was delivered for 2 s at the start of X to activate VTA dopamine neurons. As a temporal control for nonspecific effects, the same light pattern was delivered on AD trials in the intertrial interval, 120-180 s after termination of X. Finally, to verify that sensory preconditioning could be obtained with compound cues, the rats also received pairings of two novel 10-s cues with X (EF→X; 8 trials). As expected, since training did not involve pairing with rewards, rats in both groups (ChR2 and eYFP controls) exhibited little response at the food cup during any of the cues on either day of training (Fig. 2a) ; a two-factor ANOVA on food cup entries during cue presentations (cue × group) revealed no main effect (F 4,140 = 1.52, P = 0.2) nor any interaction with group (F 4,140 = 0.276, P = 0.893).
Following preconditioning, the rats began conditioning, which continued for 4 d. Each day, the rats received 24 trials in which X was presented followed by delivery of two 45-mg sucrose pellets (X→2US). Rats in both groups acquired a conditioned response to X. This was evident as an increase in the number of times they entered the food cup to look for sucrose pellets during X, across days of conditioning (Fig. 2b) . Notably, acquisition of this conditioned response was similar in the two groups; a two-factor ANOVA (group × day) revealed a main effect of day (F 3,105 = 39.71, P < 0.0001) but neither main effect (F 1,35 = 0.553, P = 0.46) nor any interaction with group (F 3,105 = 0.13, P = 0.94). Thus, the introduction of a dopamine transient at the start of X did not produce any lasting effect on subsequent processing of or learning about X. a r t I C l e S Finally, the rats received a probe test in which each of the critical test cues (C, D, F) were presented 4 times each, in an interleaved and counterbalanced order, alone and without reward. This probe test was designed to assess whether these preconditioned cues had acquired the ability to predict sucrose pellet delivery. As expected from studies of normal sensory preconditioning, rats in both groups demonstrated frequent responses to F, suggesting that, despite the use of a compound cue, they learned that F predicted X and used that relationship in the probe test to infer that F predicted sucrose pellets (Fig. 2c) . Rats in both ChR2 and eYFP groups also demonstrated infrequent responses to D (as in our pilot study; Supplementary Fig. 1 ), indicating that the presence of A and its ability to predict X had blocked D from becoming associated with X (Fig. 2c) . Notably, this occurred despite transient activation of the VTA dopamine neurons during the intertrial interval following AD trials. A two-factor ANOVA (cue × group) on responding during presentation of cues F and D revealed a main effect of cue (F 1,35 = 4.372, P = 0.044) but no main effect (F 1,35 = 0.001, P = 0.982) or interaction with group (F 1,35 = 0.287, P = 0.595). Thus, both groups exhibited identical blocking of sensory preconditioning, as indexed by a significant difference between F and D.
When delivered at the start of X on the AC trials, however, transient activation of the dopamine neurons unblocked learning, so that responses to C were more common than responses to D in the ChR2 group but not in the eYFP controls (Fig. 2c) . A two-factor ANOVA (cue × group) on responding to C and D revealed a main effect of cue (F 1,35 = 4.599, P = 0.039) and a significant interaction with group (F 1,35 = 4.154, P = 0.049). This interaction was due to a significant difference between responding to C and D in the ChR2 group (F 1,35 = 8.52, P = 0.006) but not in the eYFP group (F 1,35 = 0.006, P = 0.940). In addition, responding to D did not differ between groups (F 1,35 = 0.153, P = 0.698), whereas responding to C was significantly more common in the ChR2 rats than in the eYFP controls (F 1,35 = 5.277, P = 0.028). Thus, transient activation of the VTA dopamine neurons at the start of X on AC trials reversed the blocking effect, as indexed by the significant increase in responding to C only in the ChR2 rats.
But is the learning supported by transient activation of dopamine neurons the same as what is normally learned during sensory preconditioning? That is, did the rats in the ChR2 group respond to C because it evoked a prediction that sucrose pellets would be delivered a r t I C l e S to the food cup? To test this, we assessed the effect of devaluating the sucrose pellets on responding to C in a subset of the ChR2 rats that had been trained on the blocking of sensory preconditioning task. We divided the rats into two groups with equal responding to C (F 1,8 = 0.028, P = 0.871). After reminder training (X→2US; 12 trials; F 1,8 = 2.802, P = 0.133), rats in each group received sucrose pellets and lithium chloride injections to induce nausea (LiCl; 10 ml/kg 0.15 M) on three successive days. For one group (devalued group; n = 5), sucrose pellets were presented immediately before induction of illness. For the other group (nondevalued group; n = 5), sucrose pellets were presented ~6 h after the induction of illness. Two days after the final LiCl injection, the rats received a probe test in which C was presented as before, alone and without reward. In this test, rats in the devalued group responded significantly less to C than rats in the nondevalued group (12 trials; Fig. 3a ; F 1,8 = 6.777, P = 0.031). Devalued rats also consumed fewer sucrose pellets during a subsequent consumption test ( Fig. 3b; F 1,8 = 13 .425, P = 0.006), confirming a reduced desire for the pellets. The effect of devaluation on responding to C in the ChR2 rats was the same as what has been previously reported for a normally preconditioned cue 20, 22 , suggesting that activating dopamine neurons transiently at the start of X on the AC trials restored normal acquisition of the predictive relationship between C and X, effectively leading to anticipation of sucrose pellets upon presentation of C.
Dopamine transients are necessary for the formation of model-based associations
The above shows that transient activation of VTA dopamine neurons was sufficient to drive the formation of an association between two sensory representations. This association can then support modelbased behavior, with rats responding to C as if it predicts food through its association with X. This is important because we know that dopamine neurons exhibit transient increases in firing in the context of unexpected reward. The results described above suggest that the dopamine transient at the time of an unexpected reward should result in an association between the cue and the sensory features of the reward that could later be used to support devaluation-sensitive behavior or even economic decision-making.
Of course, the finding above does not address whether transient activation of these neurons normally contributed to sensory preconditioning or stimulus-stimulus learning in the absence of reward. Although the timing and duration of the optogenetic activation we used was designed based on the dopamine responses to reward 13, [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [32] [33] [34] , its duration was longer than the peak response typically observed in unit studies. Further, while dopamine neurons have been shown to fire in response to neutral cues 24, 29, 30 , such activity is weaker than that in response to unexpected rewards. Therefore it is not clear how similar the signal that our stimulation generated was to that caused by unexpected sensory input in the absence of reward. Further, idiosyncrasies governing viral expression and light penetration dictate that no pattern of optogenetic activation is likely to reproduce what happens normally, either here or in other similar work.
To address whether dopamine transients are necessary for model-based learning in the absence of reward, we ontogenetically suppressed activity in VTA dopamine neurons across the critical transition between the sensory cues in the first phase of a standard sensory preconditioning task. Rats were presented with two pairs of neutral cues in close succession (i.e., A→X; B→Y). Dopamine neurons were prevented from firing during the transition between B and Y but were free to fire between A and X. Subsequently, X and Y were paired directly with reward (X→US; Y→US). We reasoned that if dopamine transients were necessary for learning associations between nonrewarding events in the environment, then suppressing the firing of dopamine neurons across this transition would disrupt normal sensory preconditioning of B.
Prior to training, all rats underwent surgery to infuse virus and implant fiber optics targeting the VTA (Fig. 4) . We infused AAV5-EF1α-DIO-eNpHR3.0-eYFP (NpHR experimental group; n = 17) or AAV5-EF1α-DIO-eYFP (eYFP control group; n = 24) into the VTA of rats expressing Cre recombinase under the control of the TH promoter 31 . Note that, because reward was provided much more often in this experiment versus the first experiment (approximately twice as often), the nature of the conditioned response was different in this experiment. Rather than checking briefly many times for reward, the rats made fewer entries and spent more time inside the food cup. As a result, although we observed similar effects on both measures, here we plotted conditioned responding as the amount of time spent in the food cup rather than number of entries (see comment on response measures in Online Methods and Supplementary  Fig. 2 for more details).
After surgery and recovery, rats were food restricted until their body weight reached 85% of baseline. Training began with a day of preconditioning. Rats received a total of 12 pairings of two 10-s neutral cues (B→Y). On B→Y trials, continuous green light (532 nm, 16-18 mW output; Shanghai Laser & Optics Century Co., Ltd) was delivered for 2.5 s beginning 500 ms before the termination of B and continuing across the start of Y for 2 s in order to inactivate VTA dopamine neurons across a time window that would prevent any transient increase in activity of these neurons at the beginning of X. As a positive control, the rats also received 12 pairings of two other novel 10-s cues during this phase (A→X; 12 trials). No light was delivered across A→ X pairings. As no rewards were delivered during this phase of training, rats in both groups (eYFP and NpHR) exhibited very little responding at the food cup during cue presentation (Fig. 5a) ; a two-factor ANOVA on food cup responding during cue presentations (cue × group) revealed no main effect (F 1,39 = 1.88, P = 0.177) nor any interaction with group (F 3,117 = 0.425, P = 0.736).
Following preconditioning, the rats began conditioning, which continued for 4 d. Each day, the rats received 24 trials in which X and Y were both presented followed by delivery of two 45-mg sucrose pellets a r t I C l e S (X→2US). X was paired with one flavor of sucrose pellet, whereas Y was paired with another flavor (banana or grape, counterbalanced). Rats in both groups acquired a conditioned response to X and Y, as evident from the increase in the percentage of time they spent in the food cup during X and Y in expectation of sucrose pellets across days of conditioning (Fig. 5b) . The acquisition of this conditioned response was similar in the two groups and for both cues; a three-factor ANOVA (cue × group × day) revealed a main effect of day (F 3,105 = 43.181, P < 0.0001) but no main effect of cue (F 1,39 = 0.008, P = 0.927), group (F 1,39 = 0.094, P = 0.761) or any cue × group interaction (F 1,39 = 1.113, P = 0.298). Thus, suppression of dopaminergic activity across the transition between B and Y did not produce lasting effects on processing of or learning about Y. Lastly, the rats received a probe test in which each of the critical test cues (A and B) were presented six times each, in an interleaved and counterbalanced order, alone and without reward. As expected, rats in the eYFP group exhibited equally high rates of conditioned responding to both A and B (Fig. 5c) , showing that regardless of light delivery, they learned the predictive relationship between both cue pairs and used them in the probe test to predict the delivery of sucrose pellets. By contrast, rats in the NpHR group exhibited significantly lower conditioned responding to B, the cue at the end of which we suppressed the dopamine neurons, than to A, the control cue. A two-factor ANOVA (cue × group) revealed a main effect of cue (F 1,39 = 5.94, P = 0.019) and a significant cue by group interaction (F 1,39 = 4.68, P = 0.037). Subsequent comparisons showed that this interaction was due to a significant difference in responding to cues A and B in the NpHR group (F 1,39 = 4.952, P = 0.012), which was not present in the eYFP group (F 1,39 = 0.742, P = 0.483). Notably, this within-subject difference could not be explained by the slightly (but not significantly) increased responding to A in the NpHR group (F 1,15 = 1.9, P = 0.189, cue × response level in NpHR group; see Supplementary Fig. 3 for additional information on high versus low responders). This difference is consistent with the proposal that, by preventing transient activation of the dopamine neurons at the B→Y transition, we prevented formation of the normal association between these two cues.
DISCUSSION
We have shown that activity in VTA dopamine neurons was sufficient and necessary for the formation of associative structures that underlie model-based behavior. In our first experiment, we demonstrated that transient activation of dopaminergic neurons, with a timing and duration designed to mimic a prediction error, unblocked stimulusstimulus learning in a sensory preconditioning task, resulting in later responding that reflected a prediction of sucrose pellet delivery that could not have been directly acquired under the influence of the artificial dopamine transient we induced. In the second experiment, we demonstrated that suppressing dopamine neurons, with a timing and duration designed to interfere with any dopamine transients, blocked stimulus-stimulus learning in a sensory preconditioning task.
Current conceptualizations of dopamine transients as the reward prediction errors postulated by model-free reinforcement learning algorithms cannot explain these data. This is because the error signal in these models functions only to endow the predictive cue with a scalar quantity that reflects the value of future events; the resultant associative representation does not incorporate or link to specific information about the identity of these events beyond their value at the time of learning. As a result, this type of learning cannot explain why the rats in the first experiment searched in the food cup for sucrose pellets when C was presented in the probe test, and then stopped doing so when the pellets were no longer desirable. Even if the dopamine transients endowed C with cached value (as reinforcementlearning models propose), and this was the reason for the food cup responses, such effects on behavior would generalize beyond the specific reward and therefore be insensitive to its devaluation 35 . Indeed, if we stimulated dopamine to unblock learning when food was present, as has been done 12 , these models predict that resultant responding would be insensitive to devaluation. Likewise, responding to C in our experiment also could not have reflected direct reinforcement of the motor response by the dopamine transient, since, in contrast to even the most well-controlled prior studies 12, 14 , this response was not present when dopamine neuron activity was manipulated. Of course, such nonspecific responding would also be insensitive to devaluation Nor could the results from either experiment have reflected changes in salience or associability caused by manipulation of the dopamine neurons, either directly or via the addition or subtraction of cached value. While such effects have been reported following optogenetic activation of dopamine terminals in medial prefrontal cortex 37 , we saw no evidence of this in either of our experiments involving manipulation of the cell bodies. For example, while increasing the salience or associability of X on the AC trials in our first experiment might have indirectly allowed X to enter into an association more readily with C, all theoretical accounts of which we are aware [38] [39] [40] would also predict lasting effects on processing and associability of X. These effects would facilitate learning for X in other parts of our task, but we did not observe any evidence of increased learning about X in other trials in the ChR2 rats. In particular, the ChR2 rats did not respond more to D than controls, nor did they show more rapid conditioning to X in the second phase of training. The same is true for our second experiment, in which we saw no changes in learning about Y during conditioning, indicating that suppressing dopamine neurons did not alter the salience or value of Y. It is also worth noting that direct effects on salience would be inconsistent with evidence that activation of VTA dopamine neurons diminishes extinction learning while inhibition of these neurons facilitates it 12, 14 . These effects, achieved using the same optogenetic approaches applied here, are the opposite of what would be expected if manipulating these neurons directly altered salience.
Instead, the most parsimonious explanation of our results is that dopamine transients played a role in the formation of associative links between the neural representations of external events-whether rewarding or not-linking representations of neutral cues during preconditioning and representations of neutral cues with representations of rewards in other settings. Notably, this interpretation holds whether the ultimate behavior in the probe test reflected inference (i.e., if A→X and X→US, then A→US) or mediated learning during the conditioning phase (i.e., X evoked a memory of A that became directly associated with the US, so that later A→US; Supplementary Fig. 1) . In either case, dopamine must be influencing the association between the cues in the first phase of training. While this proposal does not negate a r t I C l e S a role for dopamine in learning about cached values, it does represent a substantial expansion of the kind of learning that dopaminergic prediction errors are thought to support. Along with recent data showing that these prediction-error signals can reflect value predictions derived from model-based associative structures 11, [41] [42] [43] [44] [45] , our results show that dopaminergic error signals are potentially richer, more complex and more capable than previously envisioned. This is good news, given how difficult it has been to find plausible candidate neural substrates to signal these other types of prediction errors; the dopamine neurons appear relatively unique in the strength of their error signaling 46 . Of course, our experimental approach affected a general population of VTA dopamine neurons that likely projects broadly to multiple target regions. The neurons activated were determined somewhat at random, based on viral expression and light penetration. In this sense, our manipulations-both the activation as well as the suppression-were not, strictly speaking, physiological. This caveat is important to keep in mind when evaluating the importance of this or any other similar study. One way to view the ability of these manipulations to produce principled results is that the relatively simple and highly constrained behavioral designs allowed us to see real effects despite our poor ability to truly reproduce real-world patterns of activity. We speculate that in normal settings, the precise sort of associative information that is acquired under the influence of dopaminergic error signals will presumably reflect subtle variations in the content of the signal 33, 47 combined with specialization of the downstream region or circuit 21, 48, 49 .
Finally, it is worth noting that our results represent the first demonstration of which we are aware that learning about neutral cues is regulated by prediction errors. That is, in our blocking of sensory preconditioning procedure, we found that prior learning of the association between A and X blocked the ability of animals to learn that D predicts X. This shows that learning to associate neutral cues reflected contingency and not just contiguity between the two cues, matching previous demonstrations of blocking for cues predictive of motivationally consequential outcomes 23 . That dopamine transients were both sufficient and necessary for this type of learning is in accord with observations that dopamine neurons exhibit error-like responses to novel or unexpected neutral cues under some conditions 24, 29, 30 . Rather than reflecting a 'novelty bonus' , such responses may reflect the informational prediction errors available in these circumstances to drive the sort of learning we have isolated here. Viewed from this perspective, the classic reward prediction errors normally observed in the firing of individual dopamine neurons might be a special (and especially strong) example of a more general function played by dopaminergic ensembles in signaling errors in event prediction. To determine whether this is true, it will be necessary to interrogate dopaminergic activity in more complex behavioral paradigms, in which the source of the errors can be manipulated independent of value. In addition, it will likely be important to monitor groups of dopamine neurons in real time, using approaches such as calcium imaging 33 to identify information represented across neurons, as has been done effectively to understand the functions of other brain regions 50 .
METhODS
Methods, including statements of data availability and any associated accession codes and references, are available in the online version of the paper.
received the injections and were given a yoked amount of sucrose pellets approximately 6 h later. Forty-eight hours after the third LiCl injection, all rats were given a final probe test in which C was presented 12 times, alone and without reward, followed by a final consumption test in which all rats were received access to 10 g of the sucrose pellets for 30 min. experiment 2. Subjects. Forty-one experimentally-naive male (n = 33) and female (n = 8) Long-Evans transgenic rats of approximately 4 months of age at surgery and carrying a TH-dependent Cre expressing system (NIDA animal breeding facility) were used in this study. Sample sizes were chosen based on similar prior experiments that elicited significant results with a similar number of rats. No formal power analyses were conducted. Rats were randomly assigned to groups and distributed equally by age, gender and weight. Prior to data analysis, two rats were removed from the experiment due to illness, virus or cannula misplacement.
Sensory preconditioning. Training used a total of four different auditory stimuli, drawn from stock equipment available from Coulbourn, which included tone, siren, clicker and white noise. Assignment of these stimuli to the cues depicted in Figure 5 and described in the text was counterbalanced across rats. Training began with 1 d of preconditioning, in which where rats received 12 presentations of the A→X serial compound and 12 trials of the B→Y serial compound. Following preconditioning, rats began conditioning, in which they received 24 trials of X and 24 trials of Y each paired with a different reinforcer (either banana or grape pellets). Following 4 d of this training, rats received a probe test in which cues A and B were each presented six times in the absence of any reinforcement.
